Introduction: where politics happens
In a recent memoir by Carrie Brownstein (2015) , the Sleater-Kinney guitarist writes about the suffocating conformism that came to characterise the Riot Grrrl movement from which the band emerged. Her frustration stems from the painful irony that this was a subculture whose origins were anything but stifling, both visceral and committed to carving out new ways of thinking about and beyond gender. Riot Grrrl ossified as it grew, with self-appointed gatekeepers always on the lookout for transgressions of mostly unspoken rules, and Brownstein found herself increasingly alienated in a world that had once felt like home.
To read across from this observation to contemporary protest movements is not glibly to suggest that despite voiced commitments to openness and inclusivity online activist cultures have tended towards the exclusive and intolerant. Instead, the takeout is a by- © Markham 2016 2 product of both the drive of those involved and the fervour of the academics who study them. It can be explained in terms of Bourdieu's field theory (1993) . As with any newly burgeoning area of activity, or with the ascendancy of a new generation of practitioners, it is not just that new conventions are established and sacred cows overturned. Also at stake are the rules of the game, in this case what counts as the meaningful practice and study of protest and other kinds of political activism. The result is that a subset of a culture of practice comes to stand for the whole -a synecdoche, like 'the Kremlin' standing in as the subject of a sentence in a news bulletin about Russian government policy, or the eye coming to represent everything involved in the act of looking. More than shorthand or symbolism, the part becomes the whole -a natural progression for field insiders, a cause for concern with outsiders mindful of what might be lost in the process.
This can be put more precisely by way of Nick Couldry's (2003) myth of the mediated centre of society, more recently (2015) transposed to social media as the myth of 'us'. By this Couldry refers to two specific risks as media institutions become embedded among the rhythms and routines of everyday life. The first risk is assuming that whatever goes on in these media, in this case anything academics observe on social media platforms, is direct evidence of wider political realities. Several of the authors in these volumes anticipate this caution, drawing on Andrejevic (2002; , and Fuchs (2013; 2014) to aver that the last thing posts on social media are is representative of reality: indeed they are nothing more than the overdetermined products of the commercial, or neoliberal, logics that drive the design, promotion and management of these platforms. Happily, the chapters under review here run the gamut from one pole to the other, and seen in the round a defensible middle ground just about emerges -one where as much as we cannot assume that what is observed in social media is an authentic expression of political reality (Dencik, in Dencik & Leistert) , nor can we responsibly reduce it to incited labour demanded by corporate tech behemoths. Epistemology matters, and the academic field of protest studies is anything but consistent in its application.
The second risk Couldry identifies lies in accepting that media are where meaningful things happen these days -more specifically for us, that social media are where politics happens now. More than crowding out other political spaces worthy of attention and investigation, we run the risk of losing sight of ways of thinking about politics that developed through academic engagement with them. At first glance there is nothing to worry about here, with the canonical texts of protest studies well represented across the Dijck (2015) describe as forgetting what we used to mean by the social before social media came along. Plenty of the work presented is nutritious, sturdy and insightful, but there is also a pervading sense of things that can be safely assumed, things it goes without saying about what happens when people use social media -and perhaps when social media use them. The result is an inevitable subsequence of specialisation: tunnel vision, though to the editors' credit several tunnels are on offer. What is often missing is an awareness of what else is going on around politically motivated social media practice.
Implicated selves of social networks
A corollary to the argument that social media politics is not simply the new politics in its entirety or purest or most developed form is that for individuals engaged in online and offline activism the stakes are not as high as is sometimes claimed. This is by no means to downplay the efficacy of or personal investment in various causes, simply that it is as speculative to presume that someone will realise her political subjectivity most fully in mediated networks as it is to begin from the supposition that her subjectivity is under existential threat from the economic and institutional logics of social media platforms.
However much someone is engaged in politics or immersed in media cultures, and however much each demands to be apprehended as a fully-formed, always-already world, that someone's whole being-in-the-world is not really at stake. This derives from Paddy Scannell's (1996) phenomenological take on television: when we switch the thing on we are confronted not just with content but whole worlds of frames, reference points, temporalities and value systems that insist on being grasped as they are and in toto. Further, this world of television demands that we engage with it as a particular kind of self -one that understands not only the natural meaningfulness of media genres but scheduling sequences and cycles, the hierarchies of a news broadcast, and how to recognise an authoritative source.
This gets political when news cultures are thrown into the mix. Now, the world into which someone is thrown every time they turn on the 10 o'clock news is one whose parameters are not only mechanical and value-laden but discursive, shaped by ways of to supplant other modes of being, but it is not a zero-sum contest between alternate subjectivities, some self-evidently better than others. Rather, in a manner closer to Goffman (1972) than Deleuze (1995) , the repertoires people learn and ultimately embody as they feel their way through media worlds are just that: they may feed into your sense of who you are, but they neither displace some originary self nor carve out space for radically new ones. To be wilfully prosaic about it, it varies from platform to platform and cause to cause. Our job is methodically to disaggregate and weigh up the implications of social media for the ways in which people think and act politically, whether as individuals or collectively.
Judith Butler points one way forward in this regard. The kind of incitement detailed in
Bodies That Matter (1993) is a strictly coercive kind of selfhood, one that is fiendishly difficult to shake off, and one to which there isn't an obviously preferable alternative in any case. But in later works such as Excitable Speech (1997) she cautiously opens up a few crevices by asking precisely what kinds of subjectification are at work when © Markham 2016 5 someone comes to adopt certain ways of dressing or walking, as well as how we are interpellated -called forth as specifically implicated selves -by institutions. Van Dijck likewise works outwards from case studies to broader theses, with The Culture of Connectivity (2013) divided into chapters focussing on different social media platforms without dragging normative baggage from one to the next. Like Scannell she very much has in mind the unsolicited, usually unacknowledged interpellation of new kinds of selfthis is how she theorises the observation that we adapt ourselves to the logics and affordances of new media forms as much as we adapt them to suit our interests, needs and desires. Resisting a more heavy-handed approach, however, she suggests that we would do well to be a bit more historical about particular social media platforms and what their adoption embeds as normal over time.
Discourses of socially mediated protest
So the point of this review is not to devise another definitive conceptualisation of social media activism and mediated politics more broadly, but to question some currently Cammaerts, Uldam & Vestergaard) is not that Castells is an apologist for the consumerist narcissism some diagnose in social media cultures. Rather, and this may be the opposite side of the same coin to his critics, it is that he is comfortable situating the individual as logically prior to the collective when it comes to politicality. An individual that precedes and survives the formation of political consciousness and movements is incompatible, for them, with how progressive politics works.
In order to test this proposition, academics have deployed both theorisations and empirical explorations of social media political activism to determine whether there is something qualitatively different about communities in which individuals remain intact, only partially implicated in the causes around which they are active. Elsewhere (Juris, 2012) this has been dubbed the politics of aggregation, but here the most commonly cited exemplar is that paper, and subsequent book, by W. Lance Bennett and Alexandra Segerberg (2012; 2013) London, stands out not just for its historicity but for its clarity and colour -it also foreshadows Brownstein's experience in detailing the exclusive, disciplinary side of DIY politics. The essential point, though, is that as with previous incarnations of the individual/collective dialectic, that offered up by Castells and by Bennett and Segerberg ultimately boils down to normative propositions. Whether all practice including activist politics is ultimately determined by and oriented towards structural reproduction, or whether it carries within it the possibility of transformation, cannot be derived from first principles after all. This is a good thing: academic discourse around protest should be about principles and ethics. It suggests, though, that it is proper to put motivation under the spotlight and to do so in a way that does not reduce all political participation to self-interest. And this means that as well as self-evident allegiance to the goals and guiding values of a particular movement, it becomes possible to look, uncynically, at motivations for activism that might include kinship and status. A protest culture isn't rendered inauthentic by its developing gatekeeping mechanisms, shibboleths and disciplinary regimes.
In other words, this is simply being reflexive about our ways of knowing and talking about politics and protest. It is not a matter of demarcating academic and activist perspectives, and there is room in these volumes for how-to guides and encomia (de Bakker, in Uldam & Vestergaard; Uldam, in the same volume; Thorburn, in Trottier & Fuchs) alongside more critical accounts. We are well beyond the convention that only disinterested outsiders can produce valid insights into political movements, and that activists can only speak to the particular and not the universal. At the same time, however, and the parallel is intended in good faith, anthropologists researching fan communities face the dilemma of selecting populations with which they share a passion and feeling of belonging, or deliberately targeting a niche interest to which they are indifferent or actively hostile. The question arises because there is very little here on right-wing protest movements and their use of or emergence through social media.
Granted, there are those who argue that most such groups do not qualify as genuine grassroots protest movements insofar as they are at base elite exercises in astroturfing (Hay, 2011) . But apart from one chapter on the neo-fascists in Greece (Kompatsiaris & Mylonas, in Trottier & Fuchs), which does not set out to investigate them as a protest movement as such but rather as social media-facilitated racist discourse -there is nothing on the Tea Party in the US, the Front National in France, the Sweden Democrats, the Party for Freedom in the Netherlands or Ukip.
Epistemologies of protest, epistemologies of power
Being reflexive about ways of knowing means taking seriously epistemology, which means in the first instance resisting reading the visible evidence of social media politics as standing for politics tout court. While important things happen on social media, it is not an elevated form of social knowledge. Resisting is difficult -because of the sheer amount of data available, because of the ease with which like-minded others can come together, mutually affirming that this is the centre of things, and because there is ample space for imagining. The last point is a crucial element in the evolution of new ways of being political, but it necessarily includes the possibility of projection. Now, projection is a dirty word, suggesting nothing more than seeing what you want to see in the face of whatever the reality is. But in practice the way that projection happens and is allowed to happen is complex, and certainly not reducible to an individual lack of rigour or acumen. However that sounds, it is not meant to be simply critical: it shows that academic discourse too is about group membership. For whom are these instinctive inferential leaps to make, and why? This is important because group membership in academic discourse is rarely about shared methodologies -it is about politics. That is entirely appropriate, but we shouldn't assume that epistemology naturally follows political conviction. And importantly, this elision becomes its own kind of gatekeeping mechanism. Another way of looking at the presentation of evidence in these volumes confirms this view. A lot of the papers give ample space over to the voices of individual protestors, often more or less unadulterated. This is a valid move in analytic and ethical terms, consistent with the ethnographic ethos of letting people speak for themselves, at least to the extent that this is possible within the production logics of the academic field.
First, though, this is not the same as grounded theory, which sets out from the same principle of listening without prejudice to participants but tries to derive and not only confirm theoretical models on the basis of their words. And second, in many cases it is assumed that what participants say is self-evident, as though there were only one way of hearing these words. Consider this, for instance, from a member of Ecologistas en Acción (from Barassi, in Dencik and Leistert):
Everybody says that there is no censorship on the internet, or at least only in part. But that is not true. Online censorship is applied through the excess of banal content that distracts people from serious or collective issues. This is presented as an expression of information overload making it difficult for political messages to reach intended audiences, which it is. But it much else besides: that 'Everybody' a clear relational positioning against conventional thought, a selfauthorisation; 'banal content' likewise valorising that which is defined against it;
'censorship' and 'distracts people' hinting that there are dark forces at work. These words do not just express or describe, they enact a way of being political whose meaningfulness is not immediately transparent.
There are particular words, too, which suggest a natural epistemology which except for field insiders is anything but: transgressive and radical, most conspicuously (see Fuchs, in Trottier & Fuchs; Uldam, in Uldam & Vestergaard) . Again there is nothing strange or questionable about using these terms, but they are scattered about as though it is obvious what constitutes a radical or transgressive act (Uldam, for instance, suggests that criticising BP is transgressive). It is not clear here whether being transgressive or radical is like being pregnant -you either are or you aren't -or if there is a sliding scale, and how this is calibrated. It isn't pedantry to question the use of specific words: there is nothing disingenuous about them, but they appear to function among webs of ideas that are self-evident only within this part of the field.
Two final big themes are worth teasing out a little. The first is violence. When it is described in these works, violence takes the form either of police brutality (Thorburn, in Trottier & Fuchs) , or the exaggeration by media of violence in demonstrations (Cable, in Trottier & Fuchs) . These are all important, but contingent on a specific reading of violence that is antithetical to the implied norms of progressive politics. The inference is that protest movements occupy the moral high ground, and it is their nefarious opponents -the state, the police, mainstream media -that resort to a-or immoral tactics to thwart them. First, this othering of violence has a clear function in terms of in-group solidarity, with collective identity made stronger in the face of adversity that is not only formidable but unjust. And second, there is a lot more going on in contemporary theorisations of violence, especially in sociology and philosophy, than is given an airing here. Key questions include not just whether violence is justifiable under certain conditions, but what violence actually is: a form of political communication, a kind of agency, and not just the opposite of voice, deliberation and subjectification.
The second theme is technology, which in more than a few papers is written about in a way that is somewhat at odds with much of the current literature -with technology ascribed something approaching volition, and more contingently still, as something external to human agency that threatens to disrupt or destroy it. There is no need to reach for actor-network theory when discussing technical infrastructures, but unqualified claims such as "Human intentionality is superseded by the uncanny intentionality of the network" (Trottier, in Trottier & Fuchs) and to write of individuals "torn to pieces" by algorithms" (Lazzarato, quoted in Leistert, Dencik & Leistert) points to a conception of social media networks that is dehumanising. Again, fair enough (see especially Barassi's persuasive application of Virilio in Dencik & Leistert, as well as Kaun's call for politics to be slowed down in the same volume), but it is presented in several chapters as a universal, taken-for-granted perspective which, outside this discursive space, it is anything but.
Conclusion: thinking beyond ways of thinking
It is inevitable when we make inferences and generalisations that we risk reading too much into things, or not enough, or just read in ways that are deceptively narrow.
Returning to Couldry's point, this is anything but a dismissal of the wealth of perspectives on social media and protest delivered here: it is rather to flag up the risks associated with accepting that this evidence and these ways of interpreting it are who we are now. And while Couldry is referring to our collective values as communities and societies, there is a corollary that concerns the way we all live with and through media in our everyday lives. Phenomena such as the rapid adoption of new media devices and platforms, and our concomitant adaption to their architectures and rhythms, are important. We are enacting distinct, inevitably constrained and possibly complicit modes of subjectivity if we pay attention to or participate in protest with an alwaysalready orientation to visibility or shareability, or to group membership dependent on patterned, time-sensitive gestures rather than affiliation secured through more traditional routes (Lovink & Rossiter, in Dencik & Leistert) . It is history forgotten as history and thus deserving of methodical excavation. It might also matter if our reorientations are towards networks designed primarily with corporate profit in mind.
But adapting to these affordances is not the same as subjection to the logics of capitalism. There may well be a link to flesh out, but it cannot be assumed that evidence of one is evidence of the other.
Similarly, positing an equivalence between surveillance and the loss of free will ("Corporate platform users effectively have lost all control over their freedom of expression after their acceptance of corporate terms of services", Leistert, in Dencik & Leistert) risks conflating the distinct epistemologies of each. If the two are related it is a complicated relationship, and though it is easy to say that it's complicated, we can follow that through with a more detailed look at the different kinds of interpellation of partially implicated selves in all manner of concrete situations: stop and search, the codification of gendered victimhood in law, the designation of a political cause as a potentially threat to national security, and so on. There are chains of events to track, the things that More generally, discourse around the media's roles and functions is a little out of step with broader trends in media studies that have tended towards greater emphasis on audience experiences and at the macro level to thinking of media organisations and industries more in terms of chaos than control (McNair, 2003) . Here, media hegemony is very much still the norm, with systematicity and orchestration taken as given in many of the chapters (see for instance de Bakker, in Uldam & Vestergaard) . Occasionally this strays into the hypodermic syringe model of media that has been rendered marginal by recent research, with talk of media outlets 'feeding' their audiences untruths (Kompatsiaris & Mylonas, in Trottier & Fuchs) . Again, this can be looked at in functional terms rather than simply dismissed as dated, with an implied valorisation of independent minority media. Likewise the tendency towards sweeping, agentless phrases like "The very use of online media and social networking by G20Meltdown was incorporated into the press' narrative of fear" (Cable, in Trottier & Fuchs) speaks to a
